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Jensen: The End (of this Discussion) of Tribal Sovereignty

THE END (OF THIS DISCUSSION) OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Erik M. Jensen

This has been an interesting exchange, and I have learned a
lot from it.
Lest there be any confusion, let me come out strongly in
favor of logic. I like logic, some of my best friends are logical, and
logic is very, very important to thinking in general and to the
law in particular.
That said, we should recognize logic's limits in
understanding the law. In particular, we should not expect any
complex body of law to form a totally coherent package. As firstyear law students outlining their courses soon come to realize,
such coherence does not exist. It probably cannot exist in a
democratic society.
To try to push two hundred years of American Indian law
into a completely logical structure, as Mr. Poore would have us
do, might be a useful thought experiment. But it does not reflect
the law as it is or as it is likely to be.
The law is sometimes an ass, and it does not cease to be the
law for that reason. Maybe tax law is illogical, as Mr. Poore
(tongue-in-cheek, I think) suggests,1 but I would not advise
going to Tax Court to contest a statutory notice of deficiency
with an argument in the form "This Code provision is not logical
and therefore should not have been enacted."
American Indian law has far more than its share of
anomalies. They are real, and we have to recognize them. Yes,
we should use logic to make the existing structure as coherent
as we can-indeed, courts are obligated to read competing legal
authority in a consistent way, if that is at all possible-but we
cannot simply read arguably illogical statutes and cases out of
the canon.
Logic is not everything; it does not mandate a particular
analytical starting point. Mr. Poore's provocative position
1 See James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes:
A Reply to Professor Jensen, 60 MoNT. L. REv. 17, 17 (1999).
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appears stronger than it is because he chooses the premises
from which his argument proceeds. Emphasize the cases and
statutes that call tribal sovereignty into question and downplay
the authority that does not, and you necessarily appear to have
2
logic on your side.
I have already made my points about citizenship's
unimportance in understanding most constitutional issues. I
3
note only that Mr. Poore's quotation from Dunn v. Blumstein,
which is presented as a showstopper, is taken out of context. The
quoted passage cannot mean that a citizen of the United States
who is also a citizen of the state of Georgia is entitled to vote in
Tennessee elections, just like a Tennessee citizen, simply
because he is residing in Tennessee at election time. Similarly, a
non-Indian does not beconfe a tribal "citizen"-that is, a tribal
member-entitled to vote in tribal elections simply because he is
4
an American citizen who resides within Indian country.
One final point. If the reason for accepting the Poore thesis
is supposed to be its impeccable logic, we should test that logic
on its own terms. Mr. Poore writes that, once Congress granted
citizenship to American Indians (whether they wanted it or not),
"Congress was obligated to provide Constitutional protections
for those citizens vis-A-vis their tribes."5 But if the granting of
citizenship really had such extraordinary effects on tribal
sovereignty, one might ask what the continuing constitutional
role for Indian tribes is. If the tribes are nothing but groups of
American citizens, legally indistinguishable from other
American citizens, why do tribes and tribal courts exist at all?
By what authority can Congress authorize tribal courts? Could
Congress establish other racially or ethnically defined courts?
We generally do not ask those questions-indeed, Mr. Poore
2 An aside: Marbury v. Madison is a peculiar example to use in defense of the
propositions that logic is everything and that logic leads to a single, indisputable
conclusion. See Poore, supra note 1, at 18. Yes, Marbury is not illogical. But con law
teachers spend a lot of time on Marbury precisely because there are so many
propositions in Marbury that go beyond constitutional text and arguably go beyond what
the Constitution requires. The conclusion in the case does not follow self-evidently from
Chief Justice Marshall's premises.
3 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), quoted in Poore, supra note 1, at 32.
4 Dunn v. Blumstein involved a narrow issue, and we should not read more into the case
than the facts justify. The issue was whether a Tennessee durational residence
requirement could be used to bar a new Vanderbilt University professor, who had in fact
moved to Tennessee in June 1970, from voting in November 1970 elections. See Dunn,
405 U.S. at 331-32, 334. In short, the case asked whether someone who had become or
was becoming a citizen of Tennessee could be barred from voting in Tennessee elections.
5Poore, supranote 1, at 25.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/2

2

1999

Jensen: The End (of REBUTTAL
this Discussion) of Tribal Sovereignty

37

himself did not ask those questions-because we take for
granted the continued existence of tribes and tribal courts. And
we do that, I suggest, because Mr. Poore's logic is not the law of
the land.
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